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Abstract
Background: Industry involvement in alcohol policy is highly contentious. The Drink Free Days (DFD) campaign (2018-
2019) run by Public Health England (PHE), an executive agency of government, and Drinkaware, an industry-funded 
‘alcohol education charity’ to encourage middle-aged drinkers to abstain from drinking on some days was criticised for 
perceived industry involvement. We examine the extent to which the DFD campaign was supported by local-authority 
Directors of Public Health (DPHs) in England – which have a statutory remit for promoting population health within 
their locality – and their reasons for this. 
Methods: Our mixed-methods approach included a stakeholder mapping, online survey, and semi-structured interviews. 
The stakeholder mapping provided the basis for sampling survey and interview respondents. In total, 25 respondents 
completed the survey, and we conducted 21 interviews with DPHs and their local authority (LA) representatives. We 
examined survey responses, and coded free-text survey and interview responses to identify key themes.
Results: While some respondents supported the DFD campaign, others did not promote it, or actively opposed it, 
due mainly to concerns about conflicts of interest and the legitimacy of industry involvement in the campaign. These 
were considered to undermine PHE’s independence and deflect attention from more important, evidence-based policy 
interventions such as alcohol pricing while conferring vicarious credibility on Drinkaware. We also found low levels of 
knowledge about alcohol-related harm, the effectiveness of different policies to address these and the policy-influencing 
strategies used by the alcohol industry.
Conclusion: The findings highlight the dangers of industry partnership and potential conflicts of interest for government 
agencies and the ineffectiveness of the campaigns they run at local and national levels. They demonstrate the need for 
caution in engaging with industry-associated bodies at all levels of government and are thus of potential relevance to 
studies of other health-harming industries and policy contexts.
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Background
From 1980 to 2014 there was a 60% increase in the 
affordability of alcohol in the United Kingdom, leading to 
increased population-level alcohol consumption and an 
increase in alcohol-related harm.1,2 This has been particualrly 
pronouced in the off-trade sectors and coincided with a 
shift in consumption patterns away from pubs and on-trade 
premises to home drinking. The affordability of beer in 
supermarket and off-licences, for example, rose by 188% and 
wine and spirits went up by 131% between 1987 and 2018.1 At 
the same time, there has been a significant increase in alcohol-
related harm including a 400% rise in liver disease since the 
1970s.2 This has given rise to highly contested policy debates 
regarding how best to address the health and social impacts 
of alcohol and the legitimate role of the alcohol industry in 
policy development and implementation of alcohol policy.3-6 
This includes debates about the role of industry social aspects 
organisations such as the UK’s Portman Group. These are 
arms-length bodies established, funded and/or controlled by 
the alcohol industry, which engage with issues surrounding 
alcohol’s societal effects.7,8
The ‘alcohol education charity’ Drinkaware was established 
by the Portman Group in 2004, before being spun off as a 
separate entity in 2006 via a memorandum of understanding 
between the Departments of Health in Westminster and the 
devolved administrations and the Portman Group. The new 
Drinkaware organisation was based in the same building 
as the Portman Group.9,10 Reflecting its origins, its board 
initially included equal representation from the public health 
community and the alcohol industry.9 Following a 2013 
review,11 Drinkaware’s management structure was reformed, 
removing industry representation from the governing 
board, and Drinkaware now occupies independent premises. 
Nonetheless, Drinkaware remains controversial for many 
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Implications for policy makers
• This study demonstrates the ways in which perceived conflicts of interest, arising from engagement with industry, may undermine the 
implementation of health policies and other initiatives at the local level.
• Policy-makers and implementers in national and local government should exercise caution when considering whether to partner, or otherwise 
engage, with health-harming industries in the development and delivery of policy measures.
• There is a need to address the often low levels of knowledge among policy-makers working in the area of alcohol and health, with regard to 
the nature of alcohol-related harms, the effectiveness of different types of policy to address these, as well as the strategies used by the alcohol 
industry to influence such policy-making.
• Policy-makers at all levels of government need to develop a more nuanced understanding of industry strategy and the ways in which influence 
may be exerted even when such actors present themselves as offering solutions to policy problems.
Implications for the public
The involvement of industry actors in the development and implementation of alcohol and other health policies is highly contentious. Public 
Health England’s (PHE’s) partnership with Drinkaware in the Drink Free Days (DFD) campaign provides a cautionary tale for policy-makers and 
implementers in national and local government faced with dilemmas about whether to engage with industry-funded bodies in the development 
or delivery of such measures. Industry participation in public health campaigns can often appear benign, but influence over policy often occurs in 
indirect ways. This may detract attention from other, more effective measures (eg, pricing increases or advertising restrictions), or shape the content 
of public messaging campaigns such as DFD. It is important, therefore, to be aware that Drinkaware is principally funded by the alcohol industry 
and how this may affect the issues they prioritise and the solutions they propose, as well as the effectiveness of government activities. Additionally, 
government agencies should be cautious in engaging such industry partners.
Key Messages 
public health actors due to its ongoing dependence on the 
alcohol industry for over 90% of its funding, which is seen to 
create at least a potential conflict of interest (COI). The latter 
refers to a situation whereby the commercial or other interests 
of actors are affected by policy regimes in ways that make it 
inappropriate for them to be involved in the development 
and/or delivery of those policies.9,12,13
Controversy surrounding Drinkaware’s role in policy 
delivery came to the fore in 2018 in relation to the Drink Free 
Days (DFD) campaign run in association with Public Health 
England (PHE); an executive agency of the Department 
of Health and Social Care, tasked with the promotion of 
population health in England. The DFD campaign sought to 
encourage drinkers aged 40-64 to abstain from drinking on 
certain days in line with the Chief Medical Officer’s revised 
2016 drinking guidelines.14 These guidelines state that men 
and women should not drink more than 14 units per week, and 
these should ideally be spread over the week, with individuals 
taking several drink-free days each week. Regular drinking 
can increase the risk of disease, including certain cancers, 
even when drinking fewer than 14 units weekly. Risks of acute 
injury increase 2- to 5-fold after drinking 5-7 units over a 
period as extended as 6 hours.14 In keeping with similar health 
messaging campaigns run by PHE, it was expected that local 
authority (LA) public health teams and Directors of Public 
Health (DPHs) – which have a statutory remit for promoting 
population health within their locality in England – would 
promote the campaign and use the associated materials in the 
service provision.
The PHE-Drinkaware co-branded campaign consisted 
of a website, mobile phone applications, radio and digital 
media campaign as well as supporting materials for LA public 
health actors to download and use. It ran in two waves from 
September to November 2018 and February to March 2019, 
and received extensive criticism from public health actors.15 
The partnership between PHE and Drinkaware led to 
concerns among some public health actors that the campaign 
may have proven ineffective or may even have undermined 
public health objectives. PHE thus undertook an independent 
review of the campaign to examine support among key 
stakeholders (ie, LA DPH) from which this study is drawn.
This article examines the extent to which, why and how, 
the DFD campaign was supported by local government 
public health actors and their perceptions of the campaign. 
In particular, it investigates how the controversial partnership 
between a government agency and an industry body affected 
the implementation of the campaign. While the scope of the 
article is limited to alcohol policy in England, the issues raised 
here about the effects of industry engagement, the perceptions 
of LA policy actors and the connections between central and 
local government on the effectiveness of health policies and 
programmes are applicable to other issues and policy contexts 
in which similar partnerships with controversial industries 
are considered. 
Methods
We undertook a mixed-methods research approach involving 
the following steps: (1) stakeholder mapping; (2) online 
questionnaire-based survey; (3) semi-structured in-depth 
interviews. The stakeholder mapping16 proceeded through 
analysis of PHE’s website and related materials, LA websites 
of English DPHs, professional associations (eg, the British 
Medical Association) and health- and alcohol-focused non-
governmental and civil society organisations (eg, Royal 
Society of Public Health) to identify relevant policy actors 
including LA DPHs in England. This provided the basis for 
the purposive sampling of respondents for the survey and 
semi-structured interviews. We identified 134 DPH posts 
across the 152 LAs in England, with 118 individual DPHs 
currently in post at the time of the study.
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The online questionnaire survey was designed using a 
survey tool provided by the host university [redacted to 
facilitate blind peer review]. Requests to complete this were 
sent via email to the 118 DPHs identified in the stakeholder 
mapping, on November 12, 2019. Follow-up emails were 
sent periodically and finally telephone calls were made to 
potential respondents in the period before the survey closed 
on December 15, 2019. In total, 25 respondents completed the 
survey, giving a response rate of 21%.
The questionnaire consisted of 29 questions organised 
around 4 key themes: (1) the respondents’ role in the DFD 
campaign; (2) the development of the DFD campaign; 
(3) the respondents’ views on the DFD campaign; (4) the 
respondents’ views on Drinkaware. Some questions were 
designed using a 5-point Likert scale, while others requested 
free-text responses. All respondents were anonymous unless 
they indicated their willingness to participate in a follow-up 
interview. Consequently, we do not differentiate between 
DPHs and other LA public health actors in reporting the 
survey results. Questionnaire responses were collated and 
analysed by calculating the frequency of particular responses 
for closed questions and through manual qualitative coding 
of the free-text responses. Given the rudimentary quantitative 
analysis undertaken, and the impossibility of ensuring a fully 
representative sample in a small ‘n’ study such as this, no 
specific statistical software was employed. The quantitative 
data are designed to give a descriptive flavour of the responses 
rather than forming the basis for more robust statistical 
inferences. The key themes identified were used to inform the 
development of the interview protocol.
A total of 21 interviews were conducted with DPHs and 
other LA public health representatives (ie, members of the LA 
public health team working under the DPH) in person or via 
telephone. Respondents were identified from our stakeholder 
mapping and from snowball sampling (ie, suggestions by 
interviewees).17-19 We interviewed at least two DPHs or other 
LA public health actors from each of the eight participating 
regions of England (the additional region, the South-West, did 
not participate in the DFD campaign). The interviews lasted 
between 15 and 60 minutes, with most around 30 minutes. 
Of the 21 interviews conducted, 18 were voice recorded as 
some respondents declined recording. Where recording was 
not permitted, detailed notes were taken by the interviewer. 
Recorded interviews were reviewed for relevance on the basis 
of the degree of engagement of the respondent with the DFD 
campaign and their ability to provide information about or 
opinions on this. Sixteen interviews were transcribed and 
thematically coded using NVivo 10 data analysis software.20 
The codebook was developed inductively and agreed after 
independent review of transcripts by two analysts before 
formal coding in NVivo 10. Interview notes from non-
recorded interviews were then reviewed for any differences in 
terms of key themes and findings and no significant variations 
were identified. In order to ensure accuracy, all quotations 
are taken from the transcribed interviews and we have not 
reproduced the responses of non-recorded interviews on 
the basis of interviewer notes. The quotations included are 
selected as examples of the points raised in the analysis below 
as not all relevant quotes can be included. However, they are 
selected on the basis that they are representative of wider 
views or trends within the overall data set analysed.
Interview respondents were provided with information 
sheets and consent forms via email prior to the interview 
and asked to give informed consent by competing the form 
before being interviewed. Usually this was done on the day 
immediately before the interview. On the form they were 
asked to indicate how their responses could be used by 
researchers and attributed in publications and other study 
outputs. The study was approved by the [redacted university] 
ethics committee. In reporting the interview responses, 
we differentiate between DPH and LA public health actors 
since transcripts were anonymised and coded according 
to these categories. We do not however draw any analytical 
distinctions between these categories.
Results
Respondent Engagement With the Campaign
The degree to which LA representatives (including DPHs) 
supported the DFD campaign varied significantly. More 
than half (52%) of respondents to the survey questionnaire 
reported that they did not promote the campaign. Of those 
respondents (44%) who promoted the campaign, the most 
common promotional methods involved liaising with 
local healthcare service providers, posting on social media, 
carrying details of the campaign on the LA website, and 
having the campaign material on LA premises (eg, local 
council buildings) (Table 1).
The in-depth interviews helped to further clarify 
respondents’ roles and engagement with the campaign. From 
these interviews, we identified three types of respondents 
(Table 2). Approximately a third of the in-depth interview 
respondents, whom we term ‘proponents,’ articulated 
strong support for the campaign. These actors undertook 
promotional activity for the campaign within their usual 
communication channels, such as LA public health websites, 
Table 1. Promotion of the Campaign by Survey Questionnaire Respondents
Question Asked Response Types No. (%)




Don’t know 1 (4)
How did you 
promote the DFD 
campaign?
Liaised with local providers 7 (35)
Social media 5 (26)
Promoted it on the LA website 4 (21)
Campaign material on LA premises 2 (11)
Abbreviations: LA, local authority; DFD, Drink Free Days.
Table 2. Type of Response to the Campaign by In-depth Interview Respondents
Respondent Groupings No. (%)
Proponents 6 (38)
Tacit supporters 4 (25)
Principled opponents 3 (19)
Other 3 (19)
Walls et al
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social media accounts and local area healthcare service 
providers:
“[Drink free days] is something that we do promote 
throughout our work, so we very much support it [the 
campaign]” (LA respondent, 11).
At the other end of the spectrum was strong opposition to 
the campaign, which led LAs to take a clear decision not to 
support the campaign and, in many cases, to articulate clearly 
that they would not be doing so. We label this group, who 
represent about a fifth of respondents, ‘principled opponents:’ 
“I absolutely wouldn’t work with [Drinkaware], and I 
certainly wouldn’t have promoted the PHE Drinkaware 
campaign because it looks like they’re endorsing Drinkaware 
as an organisation. […] we were just horrified at the fact 
that PHE would be prepared to collaborate with such an 
organisation […] So we didn’t do anything to promote 
it at all. And actually we wrote to all of our colleagues in 
the system and asked them not to promote it too” (DPH 
respondent, 4).
Other actors expressed some reservations about the 
campaign but did not explicitly oppose it. However, while 
they formally supported the campaign, their support can be 
described as lukewarm. To the extent that they promoted the 
campaign this was largely passive (ie, linking to the campaign 
on LA website), not involving any active promotional activities 
or campaigning. We term this group, who made up about a 
quarter of respondents, ‘tacit supporters:’
“We didn’t actively come out in opposition to the 
campaign, we just didn’t actively support it… So we didn’t 
actively promote it, but we didn’t make a huge thing of it. 
Obviously some of our colleagues did. We just kind of kept 
it fairly low key, we did not actively promote the campaign” 
(DPH respondent, 3).
A final group, who were about a fifth of respondents, did not 
fall clearly within any of the groups. These were respondents 
demonstrating low levels of engagement with the campaign.
Views of Drinkaware
In the responses to the survey questionnaire, almost half of 
respondents (48%) considered Drinkaware to be an ‘alcohol 
industry body,’ with 24% considering it a ‘government-
industry partnership,’ 12% describing it as an ‘independent 
health charity’ and 4% as a ‘government agency.’
Opinions were fairly evenly split with regard to whether 
Drinkaware has a legitimate role to play in providing public 
health information such as the DFD campaign. When asked 
about Drinkware’s role in general terms, 40% of respondents 
reported that Drinkaware has a legitimate role to play in public 
health information, while 36% disagreed with this (with 
24% of respondents selecting ‘strongly disagree’). However, 
respondents were more clearly opposed to the involvement of 
Drinkaware in the DFD campaign specifically. Forty percent 
(40%) of respondents said that it was not legitimate for PHE 
to partner with Drinkware on the campaign, while 24% said 
that it was legitimate. Similarly, more respondents (44%) 
thought that PHE should not undertake future campaigns in 
partnership with Drinkaware than thought PHE should do so 
(28%; Table 3).
Respondents who considered Drinkaware to be an 
‘independent health charity’ were more likely to have 
promoted the campaign (two thirds promoting it, and 
one third not promoting it), compared with people who 
considered it a ‘government-industry partnership’ (only half 
of whom promoted it). Those who considered it an ‘alcohol 
industry body’ were the least likely to promote it (one third 
promoting it, and two thirds not promoting it).
The ‘principled opponents’ group identified Drinkaware as 
an industry body and as such saw a partnership with PHE – 
a public entity, tasked with the promotion and maintenance 
of population health – to be inappropriate and representing 
a COI. Within the overall concerns about the association 
between Drinkaware and PHE – undermining the perceived 
independence of PHE while conveying vicarious credibility 
on Drinkaware – some actors were particularly concerned 
about the impact of the campaign on PHE’s One You brand 
(under which they run wider public health and lifestyle 
messaging campaigns), which featured on the campaign 
materials alongside Drinkaware’s logo. There were concerns 
also that the Drinkaware campaign would be ineffective 
and deflect attention from more important, evidence-based 
Table 3. Understandings of Drinkaware by Survey Questionnaire Respondents
Question Asked/Statement Proposed Response Types No. (%)
Which of the following best describes Drinkaware as an 
organisation?
Alcohol industry body 12 (48)
Government-industry partnership 6 (24)
Independent health charity 3 (12)
Other 2 (8)
Government agency 1 (4)
Don’t know 1 (4)
Drinkaware has a legitimate role to play in public health 
information such as the DFD campaign
Agree 10 (40)
Neither agree nor disagree 6 (24)
Disagree 9 (36)
Don’t know 0 (0)
It is legitimate for PHE to partner with Drinkaware on the DFD 
campaign
Agree 6 (24)
Neither agree nor disagree 9 (36)
Disagree 10 (30)
Don’t know 0 (0)
Abbreviations: PHE, Public Health England; DFD, Drink Free Days.
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interventions such as those around pricing. In addition to 
the general reservations about the effectiveness of relying 
on public information campaigns and individual behaviour 
change in isolation from whole population measures, some 
respondents believed the level of resources available was 
inadequate, particularly in light of the reputational damage to 
PHE and the divisions created between public health actors:
“In the past, there have been some examples of where the 
messages that they [Drinkaware] were giving, some of the 
campaigns that they’ve done have not been effective and, in 
fact, have worked the opposite way. So, I’m sceptical about 
their materials now and I don’t really trust them. Happy for 
them to give money to the government to fund campaigns, 
but not for them to be involved in the board or directing how 
those campaigns work, or the focus of them, or the messages. 
And I’m not satisfied that that happens now, so, hence I 
would avoid using them” (LA respondent, 10).
In the context of post-austerity budget cuts, and the 
increasing demands placed on LAs and associated public 
services, some respondents felt they simply could not ignore 
any additional resources or campaigns regardless of their 
governance or funding. They feared that the alternative to 
promoting the DFD campaign was that there would be no 
campaign at all and that this would have a net negative effect 
on public health.
Interestingly, the alcohol industry was frequently 
differentiated from the tobacco industry, with whom 
respondents felt it would be inappropriate to engage, while 
comparisons were also drawn frequently with the gambling 
industry as a problematic sector with which to engage. 
Alongside arguments that industry engagement is necessary, 
some respondents in this group stated that they did not see 
Drinkaware as part of the alcohol industry, and thus the 
calculation about whether to engage with them would be 
different to engaging with an alcohol producer or industry 
body directly. In some cases, respondents articulated these 
views concurrently.
“I personally find some of the stuff they [Drinkaware] 
produce quite useful, particularly some of the stats and the 
research and stuff ” (LA respondent, 1).
“I think it’s a really good organisation. I think that the tools 
and the resources are really good and […] that everyone is 
widely aware of being able to access those resources for 
campaigns and things like that” (LA respondent, 6).
“I think we’ve still got a little bit of convincing that 
Drinkaware is not, is disassociated from the alcohol industry 
[…]. But having said that, I don’t think it’s impossible to work 
as long as you have to be fully confident of the situation, 
of your partner and just be clear that […] there isn’t any 
influence to try and undermine the message […] what our 
agenda is, what our programme is” (LA respondent, 4).
Reasons for Supporting or Opposing the Campaign
Overall, the campaign was considered by survey respondents 
to be appropriate in terms of its content and messaging on 
alcohol-related harms, which were considered to reflect the 
Chief Medical Officer’s 2016 drinking guidelines.14 A greater 
proportion of respondents considered that the campaign 
was likely to help people modify their drinking (29%) than 
believed it would not (21%), while 33% were unsure if the 
campaign would have an impact. 
Free text responses to the survey questionnaire and in-depth 
interviews identified a number of reasons for supporting or 
opposing the campaign, including: Drinkaware’s involvement 
in the campaign; their capacity to undertake health promotion 
work; the local relevance of the campaign; and the poor 
communication of the campaign to stakeholders and thus 
lack of lead time to prepare. Of these the most frequently cited 
reason was the involvement of Drinkaware.
When asked, in the survey questionnaire, to indicate the 
extent to which they agreed with several statements, 20% of 
respondents said that involvement of Drinkaware was a factor 
in their decision about whether to promote the DFD campaign 
or not. Four out of five respondents in this category did not 
support the DFD campaign. Against this, 36% of respondents 
said that this was not a factor, with 44% in either the ‘neither 
agree nor disagree’ or ‘don’t know’ categories (see Table 4). 
The opposition of public health actors to Drinkaware’s 
involvement was also cited as a factor in their decision by 
20% of respondents (none of these supported the campaign), 
while 28% said that this was not a factor in their decision 
(with a combined 52% falling in the neutral and don’t know 
categories). Four of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed 
with both statements.
Among interviewees, support for the DFD campaign 
was also limited because they did not want to replicate or 
detract from local campaigns. Related to this, many LAs 
have limited budgets, multiple competing priorities and 
Table 4. Effects of Drinkaware’s Involvement in the Campaign on Survey Questionnaire Respondents
Statement Proposed Response Type No. (%)
The involvement of Drinkaware was a factor in our decision of 
whether to promote the DFD campaign
Agree 5 (20)
Neither agree nor disagree 8 (32)
Disagree 9 (36)
Don’t know 3 (12)
The opposition of public health actors to the involvement of 
Drinkaware was a factor in our decision of whether to promote 
the DFD campaign
Agree 5 (20)
Neither agree nor disagree 10 (40)
Disagree 7 (28)
Abbreviation: DFD, Drink Free Days.
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have a predetermined calendar of activities throughout the 
year. There appeared to be little willingness or capacity to 
undertake additional alcohol-related activities beyond these. 
As exemplified in the quote below, several respondents felt the 
message of taking drink-free days was too weak and potentially 
problematic as it undermined the need for individuals to 
monitor and limit aggregate weekly consumption: 
“I think the other thing as well, which is an unfortunate 
side effect of the message […], is the fact that it might 
inadvertently legitimise drink days. Someone could say well 
you’ve done two drink free days does that mean I can have 
five drink days? You can turn it on its head and that’s a 
worrying side effect” (LA respondent, 1).
Similarly, local support was affected by a perception that 
PHE did not promote the campaign adequately and thus it 
was not sufficiently visible. The lack of forewarning about the 
campaign and the lack of opportunity to feed into, or express 
reservations about, its design and execution was also a factor 
in the controversy which emerged around it identified by 
interviewees. However, while earlier engagement may have 
mitigated some of the criticisms which were articulated about 
the partnership, respondents did not feel that this would have 
fully resolved the issues. Those in the ‘principled opponents’ 
category, at least, saw engagement with what they perceived to 
be an industry body as a clear red line.
Many of those in the ‘tacit supporters’ camp shared some 
of the reservations articulated by the ‘principled opponents’ 
about the involvement of Drinkaware in the DFD campaign 
(and in public health messaging more generally), but either 
did not feel strongly enough about this to oppose the campaign 
or took what they saw as a more pragmatic approach toward 
their situation and the resources available:
“I’m probably more towards the pragmatists. I’m 
consistently frustrated by our lack of resource and ability to 
do anything and, I think, sometimes, you know, these alcohol 
companies have a social responsibility so let’s just utilise that” 
(LA respondent, 2).
Some respondents in the ‘tacit supporter’ category held what 
could be considered contradictory ‘principled’ and ‘pragmatic’ 
positions on Drinkaware. While some respondents expressed 
reservations about Drinkaware’s legitimacy as a policy actor, 
in some instances referring to potential COI and commercial 
imperatives, these were overridden by practical considerations 
and the potential to offer relevant campaigns in the context of 
limited resources. As one DPH stated, they would be open to 
potential future collaborations with Drinkaware:
“Having [said] twenty minutes ago I wouldn’t touch 
Drinkaware with a bargepole, yeah, I probably would. 
[…] Whatever my reservations about Drinkaware and my 
perception of the public health relationship being tainted, 
if they were to come out locally and it would have enabled 
me to get some resource into broader media comms 
[communications] messaging, linked to then putting forward 
a message in a way that I was more comfortable with” (DPH 
respondent, 2).
While ‘proponents’ of the campaign recognised some of 
the pragmatic and resource-related limitations on promoting 
it, they did not share the reservations articulated by ‘tacit 
supporters’ about the involvement of industry actors in the 
delivery of public health messaging like the DFD campaign. 
The rationales offered for their positions were largely couched 
in pragmatic terms: that the industry is such a significant and 
sizeable actor in the field that it simply cannot be ignored or 
excluded from the policy sphere, regardless of the reservations 
some may have about the COI. Some respondents argued 
that it would be undesirable to exclude industry given their 
resources and expertise, and would result in sub-optimal 
policy and health outcomes. Some respondents referred to 
successful partnerships between the government and PHE 
with industry actors in other sectors, such as the food and 
even the gambling industry, which they felt has had a positive 
impact on public health. As a result of this, they thought the 
same approach could be extended to alcohol.
Two other themes identified in the interviews also relate to 
respondent support for or opposition to the campaign. Firstly, 
levels of knowledge about the nature of alcohol-related harms 
and alcohol policies were low among many respondents and 
their knowledge, or at least recall, of the DFD campaign was 
also limited. This emerged in interviews as a lack of familiarity 
with the most effective, evidence-based policy measures in the 
international research consensus and the need for ‘upstream’ 
protective measures as well as the wider debate on industry 
involvement in these processes.3 Secondly, and in contrast to 
the previous point, levels of awareness of, and engagement 
with, alcohol policy topics was in the North East region 
very high. This is reflected in the response rate to interview 
requests and the insights into issues associated with alcohol 
industry engagement in policy-making which interviewees 
from this region demonstrated. Moreover, there appeared to 
be a degree of co-ordination and agreement about the response 
to the DFD campaign, and the partnership, among public 
health actors in this region. Respondents explained that this 
reflected both the need to tackle high levels of alcohol-related 
harms in this region as well as the existence of strong regional 
public health institutions and structures. These included the 
regional PHE office and regional forums for DPHs which 
facilitate an ongoing exchange of ideas between different 
LA actors. Similarly, the existence of an alcohol-focused 
organisation such as Balance North East, commissioned and 
funded by the different LAs across the region, means they 
are able to maintain a high level of engagement on alcohol 
policy issues more specifically. This was in contrast to other 
LA respondents, who discussed limited resources for alcohol 
issues and competing demands from multiple public health 
priorities. 
Discussion
This study aimed to examine the degree of support for the 
DFD campaign and the reasons for this among LA public 
health actors. While some LA public health actors supported 
the DFD campaign, strong opposition to the campaign 
expressed by others was due, principally, to concerns about 
the perceived COI arising from PHE’s partnership with what 
these respondents saw as an alcohol industry body. This was 
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felt to undermine PHE’s independence and deflect attention 
from more important, evidence-based policies while 
conferring vicarious credibility on Drinkaware, as evident in 
previous studies.21,22 A third group of respondents took a more 
equivocal position. While they expressed reservations about 
Drinkaware’s legitimacy as a policy actor and the potential for 
COIs, they saw the campaign as worthwhile in the context of 
limited public health resources. This suggests a reductionist 
conception of COI and corporate political strategy, which 
fails to recognise the indirect and long-term nature of 
much policy-influencing activity. These strategies include 
activities designed to shape the policy environment and build 
relationships with policy actors through the delivery in the 
context of constrained government resources.23
Proponents of the campaign offered largely pragmatic 
reasons for supporting and promoting it: that the industry 
is able to supply otherwise scarce resources to undertake 
public engagement work which otherwise would not occur. 
This suggests that austerity policies offer industry actors 
an opportunity to engage policy actors keen for resources. 
It reflects also the contestable assumption by LA actors 
that industry-funded campaigns are effective rather than 
counterproductive.24,25 In addition, it was felt by some 
respondents that such a significant actor simply cannot 
be ignored or excluded from the policy sphere, regardless 
of reservations about potential COI. This argument had 
both normative as well as practical components with some 
respondents arguing that it would be undesirable to exclude 
industry given their resources and expertise, and would 
result in sub-optimal policy (and health) outcomes. Analyses 
of corporate strategy have identified attempts by industry 
to frame the terms in which policy debates are conducted, 
and the views of these respondents reflect the type of issue 
framing which the alcohol industry seeks to perpetuate.21,26,27 
This reflects the extent to which public discourses on alcohol-
related harms and policy approaches are often structured in 
terms amenable to industry-favoured approaches.26
We also found generally low levels of knowledge about the 
nature of alcohol-related harms, the effectiveness of different 
types of policies to address these and the strategies used by the 
alcohol industry to influence these among LA respondents 
working in the area of alcohol and health. This may have led 
some LA actors to underestimate the potentially negative 
effects of industry-associated campaigns which seemed to 
provide additional resources. Industry-funded bodies may 
engage with programmes such as the DFD campaign which 
directly coincide with the work of these LA actors as part of 
their wider corporate social responsibility strategies, including 
funding bodies such as Drinkaware.13,21,28 These are rarely 
effective but may have a policy displacement effect, detracting 
attention from other, more impactful measures.24,25,29 A 
higher level of awareness about the issues raised by industry 
engagement and the often indirect, and apparently benign, 
ways in which industry actors may seek to engage and thereby 
compromise LA actors is needed. Given the relatively high 
awareness of the issues raised here and the identification with 
alcohol-related issues more generally in the North East there 
may be the potential for policy learning and shared practice 
with other regions. 
Drinkaware’s involvement in the DFD campaign fits with 
the now extensive body of literature that documents the 
corporate political strategies of health-harming industries, 
including transnational alcohol corporations.4,21,23,26,30-34 
It supports recent studies which focus also on the 
implementation phase of the policy process as a key aspect of 
alcohol industry strategy,34,35 like that of the tobacco industry 
before it.36 It demonstrates also the potential importance 
of local-level poltical activity to alcohol- and other health-
harming industry actors and the need to inform and protect 
local government actors, and policy implementation more 
generally, from industry influence.
For organisations such as PHE and other government 
agencies it highlights the potential reputational damage from 
partnership with bodies linked to the alcohol industry (eg, 
through Drinkaware’s financial reliance on industry funding) 
or even those perceived to be. Since this can have a direct 
impact on the effectiveness of the policy measures they adopt, 
and the effectiveness with which these can be implemented, 
perceptions of COI or industry connections may have a 
tangible impact on the delivery of these organisations’ core 
activities as well as their reputation for independence.
In addition, the present study demonstrates the degree to 
which knowledge and values (ie, on industry involvement in 
health policy) of front-line, local policy actors tasked with 
implementing national decisions and campaigns, such as 
DFD, will influence the uptake of, and the degree of buy-in for, 
these measures, thereby affecting the degree of support, and 
likelihood of success, it received. While all LAs face limited 
resources and industry-funded or associated campaigns may 
represent additional resources, accepting these may come 
with a price, and well-informed policy actors are better placed 
to evaluate these issues and make appropriate decisions. 
What is evident from the proceeding analysis is that the 
delivery of the programme, and the degree of promotion it 
received from LA actors and NGOs, was impacted by the 
involvement of Drinkaware and the perception among these 
policy implementers that this was an industry body with a 
clear COI in its involvement with this programme, and with 
government agencies such as PHE more generally. From a 
process perspective policy delivery was at least suboptimal, 
although where the divide between success and failure lies, 
and the usefulness of such a binary evaluation, is unclear. 
The limitations of this study included the response rate to 
the online survey (21%), which was low but comparable to 
what is often obtained with this type of method.37-40 To gain 
a reliable understanding of policy processes and events,41 we 
triangulated survey findings against the in-depth interview 
data. There were a relatively high number of respondents 
responding ‘don’t know’ to certain questions indicating low 
levels of engagement with the campaign in some quarters. 
The relatively high proportion of interviewees declining audio 
recording compared to previous studies undertaken by the 
authors in the area of alcohol policy reflects the controversial 
nature of the campaign and the wider policy space. The 
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relatively small number of respondents and lack of sampling 
procedures mean that the quantitative data presented need 
to be treated with caution and are designed to be indicative 
of trends among participants, rather than robust statistical 
findings which would require a study of larger ‘n’ and the 
application of different methods and analytical techniques. 
Conclusion
Given the potential COIs involved in engagement with 
industry-funded bodies, the above findings provide a 
cautionary tale for policy-makers and implementers in 
national and local government faced with dilemmas about 
whether to partner, or otherwise engage, with industry-
associated bodies in the development or delivery of policy 
measures. Finally, they highlight the need for policy-makers at 
all levels to develop a more nuanced understanding of industry 
strategy, the legitimate role for industry-associated bodies in 
policy-making and delivery and the ways in which influence 
may be exerted even when such actors present themselves as 
offering solutions to ongoing policy problems. This will be 
of relevance to alcohol policy and policy implementation 
scholars in the United Kingdom and beyond as well as those 
engaged in policy debates in other areas affected by health-
harming industries. 
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